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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Sec. 78-2a-3(2) (d), U.C.A. (1988, Supp), Sec. 
77-35-26(4)(a) U.C.A. (1988, Supp) and Rule 26, Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction by jury of negligent 
homicide in the Second Circuit Court, State of Utah, Davis 
County, Layton Department. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the Court err when it held that the State's medical 
expert witnesses were qualified to state the medical standard of 
care applicable to the delivery and immediate care thereafter of 
an infant in a home birth setting? 
2. Did the Court err when it held that the State was not 
required to present expert medical evidence as to the degree 
Defendant's conduct allegedly deviated from the medical standard 
of care? 
3. Was there sufficient evidence establishing a causal link 
between Defendant's alleged misconduct and the death of the 
infant child so as to support the jury's finding that Defendant 
was guilty of negligent homicide. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of this case. 
During the late evening hours of November 7, 1986, 
Defendant, who is a physician licensed by the State of Utah, 
attended the delivery of a male infant at the home of his mother 
and grandmother in Kaysville, Davis County, Utah. 
Following birth, and after assessing the well-being of the 
child. Defendant left the infant in the care of his mother and 
grandmother. Approximately 12i hours following birth, the child 
died. 
Defendant was later charged and convicted of the crime of 
negligent homicide in connection with the death of the child. It 
is that conviction from which Defendant now appeals. 
B. Course of proceedings. 
Defendant was initially tried by jury beginning November 16, 
1987. However, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18, 
1987, due to improper testimony given by one of the State's 
witnesses (R. at page 3). 
Defendant was again tried by jury beginning February 22, 
1988, which continued through February 26, 1988. He was 
convicted of the offense charged (R. at page 7). 
On March 11, 1988, Defendant filed a Motion to Arrest 
Judgment (R. at pages 73 through 133). The Motion was heard 
April 7, 1988 (R. at page 7). The Court denied the Motion in a 
written decision dated June 23, 1988 (R. at pages 154 through 
159) . 
Defendant was sentenced August 10, 1988, (R. at page 8) 
following which he filed a Motion for a New Trial and In the 
Alternative a Petition to Stay Execution of Sentence Pending 
Appeal and for Issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause (R. at 
pages 161 through 174). 
Counsel agreed that the Court rule on those matters without 
argument. The ruling was in written form dated September 19, 
1988 (R. at pages 181 through 182) . The Motion for a New Trial 
was denied but the Petition to Stay Execution of Sentence and 
Issue a Certificate of Probable Cause was granted (R. at page 9). 
Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on September 30, 1988. 
(R. at page 185). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. 
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See subparagraph B above. 
D. Statement of facts. 
Defendant is a physician having graduated from the 
University of Pennsylvania Medical School in 1964. His 
internship was at Madigan General Hospital, Fort Lewis, 
Washington (T. Vol. IV, page 40, lines 8 - 20). After four years 
in the military service, he settled in Kaysville, Davis County, 
Utah, to practice family medicine where he has been ever since 
(Id. at page 43, lines 12 - 20). He was Board certified in 
family medicine in 1970 and has been until the present time (Id. 
at page 43, lines 22 - 25 and page 44, lines 1 - 13). 
During his practice, Defendant attended approximately 2500 
deliveries, 300 of which were home deliveries (Id^  at page 45, 
lines 9 - 25) . A home delivery patient must be low risk, 
hospital facilities should be near in case of emergency and there 
must be family support for the mother and child following 
delivery (I<3. at page 48, lines 1 - 2 5 ; page 49, lines 1 - 2 3 ; 
page 240, line 6; page 242, line 11). 
The mother of the deceased child is Joanne Young. She lived 
in Kaysville, Utah, with her parents, Maurice and Ivy Young, who 
are from England having arrived in the United States in 1985 (T. 
Vol. I at page 42, line 19 - page 44, line 7). Maurice and Ivy 
are the parents of seven children (Joanne being number 5) all of 
whom were born in England. Four were home deliveries (Id. at 
page 44, line 24 - page 45, line 3). 
Joanne became pregnant out-of-wedlock in early 1986. She 
thought conception had occurred in March (T. Vol. Ill, page 40, 
lines 10 - 15) . She told her parents in early summer. 
Thereafter, Joanne and Ivy went to see Dr. Mark Bitner who 
specializes in obstetrics and was officed at the Tanner Clinic in 
Layton, Utah (Id., at page 40, line 10 - page 42, line 18). 
They visited Dr. Bitner twice - once on June 27 and again 
August 8, 1986 (T. Vol. II, page 173, line 24 - page 174, line 4 
and page 176, lines 15 - 18). A complete OB exam was not 
performed on the first visit because there was a question about 
payment (Ij3. at page 174, lines 23 - 25 and page 218, lines 19 -
22) because Maurice did not have medical insurance coverage for 
his daughter (Id. at page 148, line 14 - page 150, line 8). 
Nevertheless, Joanne and Ivy returned for the second visit at 
which time a complete OB exam was done. Her pregnancy was 
determined to be normal (low risk) (Id. at page 226, lines 16 -
page 228, line 16; T. Vol. Ill, page 202, lines 2 - 4 and T. Vol. 
IV, page 243, line 13 - page 246, line 2) and the date of 
delivery determined to be in early December, 1986. However, Dr. 
Bitner recommended an ultrasound to confirm that finding because 
he was uncertain (T. Vol. II at page 219, line 12 - page 220, 
line 12). Joanne never returned for the test. She and her 
family were concerned about the cost of a hospital delivery (T. 
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Vol, III, page 101, line 1 - page 104, line 3; T. Vol. II, page 
149, line 21 - page 150, line 8 and Id. at page 341, line 7 -
page 342, line 5). 
Joanne and Ivy decided on a home delivery and asked 
Defendant to attend (T. Vol. Ill, page 49, lines 4 - 15). They 
visited him September 8, 1986 (Id. at page 50, lines 15 -20). 
Defendant examined Joanne and assessed her for home delivery. He 
found her to be a suitable candidate and agreed to attend the 
birth of her child (T. Vol. IV, page 51, line 21 - page 59, line 
19) . Defendant confirmed the date of delivery to be early 
December, 1986 (If3. at page 57, line 3 - page 58, line 9). He 
saw her again October 6, 1986. The exam did not change his prior 
assessment (3J3. at page 60, line 9 - page 63, line 12). 
On the morning of November 7, 1986, Defendant was at the 
University of Utah Football Stadium with the Davis High School 
Football Team as its team physician where they were participating 
in the State Tournament. He was contacted by Ivy through his 
remote telephone and advised that Joanne had awakened with some 
vaginal bleeding evidenced by spotting (T. Vol. IV, page 67, line 
7 - page 69, line 22; T. Vol. Ill, page 107, line 4 - page 106, 
line 18) . Both Ivy and Defendant were concerned that labor was 
beginning early. Defendant advised Ivy to keep Joanne down and 
call him about 1:00 p.m. or sooner if the situation worsened (T. 
Vol. II, page 20, line 7 - 2 3 ; Vol. IV, page 69, line 7 - page 
71, line 5). 
Ivy called again about mid-day and advised Defendant that 
the bleeding had stopped and that John Shaw, the father of the 
child, had said conception may have occurred a month earlier 
which would make Joanne full term (T. Vol. IV, page 71, line 7 -
page 73, line 19; Vol. Ill at page 108, line 19 - page 110, line 
20; Vol. II, at page 20, line 20 - page 22, line 21 and Id., at 
page 339, line 4 - page 340, line 3). Defendant advised Ivy to 
call again around 5:00 p.m. if Joanne appeared to be continuing 
with labor (T. Vol. IV, page 73, lines 3 - 1 9 ) . 
Ivy called late afternoon and advised Defendant that Joanne 
was having occasional contractions. He instructed her to call 
when the contractions were three to five minutes apart (T. Vol. 
IV, at page 74, line 24 - page 75, line 25; T. Vol. I, at page 
65, line 17 - page 66, line 23 and Vol. II, page 25, line 7 -
line 23). 
Ivy called Defendant at home about 10:15 p.m. and advised 
that Joanne was in the last stages of labor. Defendant arrived 
at the Young residence at 10:30 p.m. (T. Vol. I, page 67, line 2 
- page 68, line 18) . 
Upon arrival, he met Maurice at the door, went into the 
bedroom, examined Joanne, found that delivery was imminent and 
delivered a male infant at 10:40 p.m. The child presented in a 
breach position and was delivered within one minute without 
difficulty. There was no evidence of untoward bleeding nor was 
the amniotic fluid tinged with blood. The child breathed 
spontaneously without stimulation, had a normal heart rate and 
Defendant assessed the infant as having a one minute and five 
minute APGAR score of 8 which indicated that the child had good 
potential for sustaining life (T. Vol. IV, page 77, line 17 -
page 86, line 5). 
The child was small. Defendant estimated his weight as 
being between 4 - 5 pounds. Defendant thought it was premature 
(T. Vol. IV, page 86, lines 8 - 1 8 ) . 
Following birth, the child exhibited some symptoms of 
grunting respirations which could be controlled by positioning 
the child. Defendant advised Ivy that perhaps hospitalization 
was indicated. She expressed concern about the expense. 
Defendant thereupon showed Joanne how to nurse the child, 
instructed her on how to keep the child warm and told Ivy that 
she must watch the child during the night regarding his 
temperature, color and respiration^ and if they worsened to call 
him. Ivy acknowledged the instructions and Defendant left the 
home at about 11:30 p.m. (Id. at paq j 96, line 13 through page 
105, line 4; Vol. 1, page 85, lines 15 - 18; Vol. Ill, page 122, 
line 12 - page 130, line 11). 
Defendant did not hear from the family until the next day 
about noon when he called the home and was advised the child had 
died. (Id. at page 111, line 7 - page 113, line 5). 
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and the child into 
another bedroom where it was warmer. On two occasions, she 
observed that the child's hands and feet were "very blue" which 
concerned her. About 5:00 a.m. they got the child up and Joanne 
held him. He still appeared blue. They wrapped him in a quilt. 
At 8:00 a.m., the child appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy 
observed the condition and resusitated him. She did not want 
Joanne to be aware of the situation. Ivy worked with the child 
for approximately 20 minutes (T. Vol. I, page 86, line 17 - page 
97, line 24; Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - page 68, line 11; Vol. 
Ill, page 136, line 7 - 1 2 ) . 
Ivy called Iris Auger, a friend and neighbor, at about 8:30 
a.m. and told her of the birth and that the child was small. 
Iris recommended that the child be hospitalized. Ivy said they 
were trying to get the doctor. Ivy did not disclose to Iris that 
the child had appeared to have stopped breathing minutes earlier 
nor that there was any emergency (T. Vol. V, page 75, line 15 -
page 83, line 3; Vol. V, page 87, line 19 - page 88, line 2). 
Ivy called Defendant's office between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. but 
he was not in. She did not identify herself or report any 
emergency concerning the child. She also called Defendant's home 
but he was not there. Again, she did not identify herself or 
report any emergency. (T. Vol. I, page 95, line 20 - page 97, 
line 23; Vol. II, page 69, line 6 - page 72, line 5; Vol. V, page 
23, line 6 - page 26, line 11). 
- 12 -
During the night and morning hours Ivy did not contact 
Defendant, did not call the paramedics and did not take the child 
to the hospital notwithstanding the child's deteriorating 
condition (T. Vol. II, page 75, line 14 - page 77, line 11). 
Rather, she called her Bishop in the LDS Church but did not 
advise him of any emergency. The Bishop contacted Frank Kramer, 
M.D., a pediatrician who went to the Young home (T. Vol. V, page 
38, line 2 - page 45, line 3; Vol. II, page 260, line 21 - page 
261, line 25). 
The Bishop and Dr. Kramer arrived about 10:30 a.m. The 
child appeared lifeless. He was rushed to Humana North Davis 
Hospital where he was pronounced dead at approximately 11:15 a.m. 
(T. Vol. II, page 283, lines 20 - 23; Id. at page 262, line 1 -
page 268, line 9). 
A post-mortum examination indicated the child died of 
respiratory distress syndrome (R. at pages 69 - 71). 
Defendant was available by telephone during the night of 
November 7th and the morning hours of November 8th. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant makes three arguments in connection with his 
appeal: 
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1. The State called expert medical witnesses to prove the 
applicable standard of medical care in a home delivery setting. 
However, none of those witnesses had ever attended a home 
delivery, did not teach home delivery medical standards of care 
and were philosophically opposed to home deliveries. Under the 
circumstances, the witnesses were of a different school of 
medicine than Defendant relative to home deliveries and thus were 
not qualified to testify as to the applicable medical standard of 
care. 
2. Assuming that the State's witnesses were qualified to 
testify as to the applicable medical standard of care, 
nevertheless, the State failed in its proof against Defendant 
because there was no testimony presented as to the degree 
Defendant's conduct deviated from the standard. A mere deviation 
constitutes civil negligence. Criminal negligence necessitates a 
gross deviation giving rise to a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that death will occur. Since this is a criminal case 
arising out of a medical context, there must be expert medical 
testimony as to whether a deviation occurred and as to the degree 
of the deviation. There was no such testimony presented during 
trial. 
3. Negligent homicide requires testimony establishing a 
causal link between Defendant's alleged criminal negligence and 
the death of the child. In this case, there is insufficient 
evidence to establish that link beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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As a result of the three foregoing arguments, the State 
failed in its proof against Defendant entitling Defendant to a 
reversal of his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide, a Class A 
Misdemeanor. The applicable statute defining the offense is 
U.C.A. §76-5-206(1) (1953 replacement), which states: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide 
if the actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes 
the death of another. 
Criminal negligence is defined in U.C.A. §76-2-103(4) (1953 
replacement), as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: . . . 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and justifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist of the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Based on the foregoing, the State had the burden of proving 
the following elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1. That Defendant's conduct resulted in circumstances 
which; 
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2. Created an unreasonable and unjustifiable risk; 
3. Constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care 
which; 
4. Caused the death of the infant child. 
Since the factual context of this case involves medical care 
rendered by a physician in a home delivery setting, it was 
necessary that expert medical testimony be presented to 
establish: 
1. The applicable medical standard; 
2. That Defendant's conduct was a gross deviation from the 
standard; and 
3. That the alleged breach caused the death of the child. 
Defendant's arguments deal with each point separately. 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S MEDICAL EXPERTS WERE NOT QUALIFIED 
TO TESTIFY AS TO THE APPLICABLE MEDICAL STANDARD 
BECAUSE THEY WERE OF A DIFFERENT SCHOOL OF 
MEDICINE THAN DEFENDANT. 
A. A medical standard of care must be determined by expert 
medical testimony. 
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In Marsh v. Pembertonf 10 Utah 2d, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that: 
The ordinary care and skill required of a doctor in a 
community in which he serves must necessarily be 
established by expert testimony. 
347 P.2d at 110. 
See also Forrow v. Health Services, 604 P.2d 474, 477 - 478 
(Utah, 1979); Chadwick v. Nielsen, M.D., 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) and Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 
P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The rule is the same whether the standard of medical care 
arises in a civil or criminal case. In State v. Hodgdon, 416 
P.2d 647 (Ore 1966), the Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2, 
commenting on the definition of "gross negligence" in a negligent 
homicide case, explained: 
The term . . . is the same when applied to civil law 
as when used to define and ingredient of a crime. 
416 P.2d at 649. See also State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 235, 239 
(Utah 1980). 
B. Moreover, the expert must be of the same school of medicine 
to render an opinion as to a particular medical standard of care 
as the school of medicine practiced by the person against whom 
the standard is to be applied. 
Utah adheres to the rule that a medical standard of care can 
only be established by an expert witness of the same school of 
medicine as the school in which the standard is sought to be 
applied. 
In Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held: 
It is true that, ordinarily a practitioner of one 
school of medicine is not competent to testify as an 
expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner 
of another school. In light of the wide variation 
between schools in both precepts and practices, as a 
general matter, this rule makes good sense. It has 
been adopted in a majority of states and we follow it 
here. (Emphasis added). 
711 P.2d at 248. 
There is, however, an exception to the general rule: 
. . . an expert witness belonging to one school may 
competently testify against a member of another 
school once sufficient foundation has been laid to 
show that the method of treatment - and hence the 
standard of care - is common to both schools. 
Id. 
Our case is unusual in this regard because the standard of 
care must be of the school of medicine involving a family 
practitioner managing labor, delivery and neonate care in the 
context of a home birth setting. 
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C. The State's expert witnesses were not of the same school of 
medicine as Defendant and were therefore incompetent to testify 
as to the applicable medical standard. 
The State called several expert medical witnesses, none of 
whom were of the same school of medicine as Defendant. 
1. Mark Bitner, M.D.: Dr. Bitner was the first 
obstetrician who cared for Joanne. He specializes in obstetrical 
medicine (T. Vol. IIf page 173, lines 11 - 13). He was asked to 
comment on the standard of care relating to the management of 
Joanne's labor in her home birth setting. 
On the issue as to whether Defendant should have removed 
Joanne from her home to a hospital for ultrasound evaluation 
after evidence of bleeding on the day of delivery. Dr. Bitner 
acknowledged he didn't know how to answer the question because he 
doesn't do home births and is biased against them (Id. at page 
196, lines 6 - 22? page 217, lines 15 -25). 
Nevertheless, over objection, the State was allowed to 
elicit testimony that Defendant was outside the applicable 
standard of care (home birth setting) in not assessing the 
bleeding condition in a hospital as opposed to the conservative 
approach of Defendant in waiting and watching (£d. at page 205, 
line 25 - page 210, line 9). 
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Notwithstanding his opinion, on cross-examination. Dr. 
Bitner acknowledged several differences between hospital and home 
birth deliveries (Id. at page 214, line 10 - page 217, line 14); 
that medicine is the art of exercising medical judgment based 
upon experience and expertise (Id. at page 233, line 16 - page 
236, line 18); that Defendant's judgment as to the implication of 
Joanne's bleeding proved correct (jld. at page 234, line 19 - page 
241, line 8); and that Defendant is a competent physician (Id. at 
page 230 lines 15 - 25). 
Under the circumstances, the jury was placed in the position 
of determining whether Dr. Bitner's opinion that Defendant was 
outside the standard of care was correct or his contrary opinion 
on cross-examination that Defendant's judgment and management of 
Joanne's labor was medically sound. It was prejudice to 
Defendant for that conflict to exist in that Dr. Bitner should 
not have been allowed to express his opinion on the issue in the 
first instance in that he was of a different school of medicine 
than Defendant. Moreover, there was no testimony presented that 
the treatment rendered by Defendant in the home birth setting 
would be the same as the treatment rendered by Dr. Bitner who 
does not do home deliveries. Consequently, the exception to the 
general rule does not apply. 
2. Branch Ware, M.D.; Dr. Ware is a Board certified 
obstetrician on the staff at the University of Utah Medical 
Center (T. Vol. Ill, page 155, lines 13 - 16), who doesn't attend 
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home deliveries, doesn't teach home deliveries and doesn't 
recommend home deliveries. (Ic[. at page 223, line 24 - line 15). 
Nevertheless, over objection. Dr. Ware was allowed to 
testify concerning standards of care applicable in a home birth 
setting concerning vaginal bleeding of the patient and care of 
the newborn. (Id. at page 158, line 18 - page 198, line 35). 
3. Frank D. Kramer, M.D.: Dr. Kramer is a Board certified 
pediatrician (T. Vol. II, page 260, lines 8 - 15). He was called 
and asked to go to the Young residence by their Bishop (Id. at 
page 260, line 12 - page 261, line 12). 
During Dr. Kramer's testimony, he expressed the opinion that 
the child should have been immediately hospitalized (Icl. at page 
276, lines 4 - 9 ) . He felt that home births are risky because of 
the need to repose confidence in the family after delivery to 
watch the child. His opinion was premised upon philosophical 
principles and not home birth standards (Id^ . at page 292, line 23 
- page 303, line 2). Therefore, his testimony was also based 
upon a different school of medicine than that of Defendant. 
4. Gary Chan, M.D.: Dr. Chan is Chief Neonatologist -
Pediatrician at the University of Utah Hospital - Medical School 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (T. Vol. Ill, page 238, line 7 - 9 ) . He 
does not attend home deliveries. The practice is not taught at 
the medical school where he teaches (Id. at page 266, line 17 -
- 21 -
page 277, line 16), He is reluctant to vest confidence in the 
family to observe the newborn (3J3. at page 269, line 10 - page 
270, line 9) and acknowledges that the key in home delivery is 
whether the family is able to recognize changes in the child 
during the immediate observation period following birth. He too 
is therefore of a school of medicine different than that of 
Defendant. 
The only witness called who was qualified to testify 
concerning the medical standard of care applicable to labor and 
delivery in a home birth setting was Dr. Gregory White who was 
called by Defendant. He is a family physician who practices home 
deliveries and is a member of the American College of Home 
Obstetrics. (T. Vol. IV, page 234, line 12 - page 289, line 25). 
At no time during his entire testimony did Dr. White indicate 
that Defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care (Id. 
at page 234 - page 290). 
Since the State's experts were not of the same school of 
medicine as Defendant, the State failed in its proof as to the 
proper medical standard of care entitling Defendant to a reversal 
of his conviction. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO TESTIMONY IN THE RECORD AS TO THE 
DEGREE OF DEVIATION FROM THE APPLICABLE STANDARD 
OF CARE. 
"Criminal negligence" requires a mens rea defined as a 
"gross deviation from the standard of care." U.C.A. §76-2-103(4) 
(1988 Supp.). 
In medical cases, the standard of care must be established 
by qualified expert medical testimony because "the nature of the 
profession removes the particulars of its practice from the 
knowledge and understanding of the average citizen." Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). Moreover, the physician's 
failure to meet the standard of care must also be established by 
expert medical testimony. The Court in Nixdorf states as 
follows: 
[B]efore the Plaintiff can prevail in a medical 
malpractice action, he must establish both the 
standard of care required of the Defendant as a 
practicing physician in the community and the 
Defendant's failure to employ that standard. 
(Emphasis added) 
Id. at 351, See also Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980). 
This principle is adhered to by other jurisdictions. In 
Miller v. Van Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143, (Col Ct. App. 1980) the 
Court held that it is: 
. . . incumbent upon the Plaintiff (prosecution) to 
prove by expert testimony that Defendant departed 
from the standard of care required from Defendant as 
a physician. (Emphasis added) 
628 P.2d at 245. 
In Harvey v. Kellin, 566 P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1977), the Court 
held: 
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[A] general practitioner in treating a patient must 
use the degree of skill and learning exercised by 
general practitioners in the same or similar 
community. The standard must be shown by affirmative 
evidence and a deviation from it must be established 
by expert medical testimony. (Emphasis added) 
566 P.2d at 300. 
See also Baylor v. Jacobsen, 552 P.2d 55, 58 (Mont. 1976). ("the 
standard of care to which a medical practitioner is held and the 
breach thereof must be established by expert medical 
testimony."). 
Although the State offered evidence in this case 
establishing what it believed to be the requisite medical 
standard of care, it utterly failed to offer any evidence 
establishing the degree of deviation therefrom by Defendant. 
There is testimony in the record in which a State's expert 
witness said Defendant's conduct was outside the standard of care 
but never did the State present evidence as to the "degree of the 
deviation." A mere deviation from the standard is civil 
negligence only - not criminal negligence, which requires a gross 
deviation giving rise to a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that death will occur. No such testimony was presented at trial. 
Defendant moved for a non-suit at the conclusion of the 
State's case, one of the reasons being that there was no evidence 
as to the degree of deviation from the standard of care. The 
Court denied the motion (T. Vol. Ill, page 283, line 14 - page 
305, line 22). The same issue was raised in Defendant's Motion 
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to Arrest Judgment which was also denied (R. page 75 - 134 and 
154 - 159). Both denials were error justifying this Court's 
reversal of Defendant's conviction in the Court below. 
POINT III 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A 
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT'S ACTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE BIRTH AND THE IMMEDIATE CARE 
OF THE CHILD AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DEATH. 
For one to be convicted of negligent homicide, it must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged "gross 
deviation" from the standard of care "caused the death" of 
another. U.C.A. §76-5-206(1) and §76-2-103(4) (1953 
replacement). In the case at bar, there is insufficient evidence 
to establish that causal link. 
This Court " . . . may review the verdict of a jury in a 
criminal case and reverse as a matter of lav; if (the Court) 
find[s] the evidence is insufficient" (State v. Harmon, 99 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 34, 35, Utah Court of Appeals, January 10, 1989). See 
also State v. Cantee, 750 P.2d 591, 593 (Utah 1988). However as 
this Court stated, the standard for reversal is high: 
We reverse . . . only when the evidence . . . is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have determined a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the 
crime. 
Id. at page 35. 
See also State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
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In the case at bar, the State alleged that Defendant's 
conduct was outside the medical standard of care thus giving rise 
to certain unreasonable and unjustifiable risks which caused the 
death of the child. Those risks are stated as follows: 
A. Vaginal bleeding; 
The State elicited expert testimony from Dr.s Bitner and 
Branch that vaginal bleeding on the day of delivery gave rise to 
a potentially serious problem (placenta previa, obrupto, etc.) 
necessitating hospital evaluation. Since Defendant responded 
with conservative care (watch and wait) as opposed to requiring 
Joanne to be admitted to a hospital, the State contended he was 
outside the applicable standard of care (T. Vol. II, page 172 -
page 259; Vol. Ill, page 155 - page 233). 
However, the testimony of the doctors make it clear that the 
bleeding did not result in a placental accident (T. Vol. II, page 
240, line 19 - page 241, line 8; Vol. Ill, page 203, line 13 -
page 205, line 2), did not injure the child nor result in its 
death. Consequently, there is no causal link between the 
bleeding and the deviation from the alleged medical standard. 
B. Leaving the child with Ivy and Joanne following its birth 
without insisting upon hospitalization: 
_ oc __ 
The state also elicited expert testimony from Dr.s Kramer 
and Chan that it was outside the standard of care for Defendant 
to leave the child with his grandmother and mother following 
birth when he was premature and had manifested symptoms of 
possible respiratory distress (T. Vol. II, page 259, line 23 -
page 282, line 24, Vol. Ill, page 234, line 5 - page 257, line 5) 
even though there was a 98% chance that the child would not 
require medical intervention (^ d. at page 257, line 19 - page 
261, line 6) . 
Nevertheless, Dr. Kramer testified that the child's life 
might have been spared had he received medical attention up to 
eleven hours after birth (T. Vol. II, page 290, line 18 - page 
292, line 14) and Dr. Chan testified that his life may have been 
spared had he received medical attention up to twelve hours after 
birth (T. Vol. Ill, page 264, line 7 - page 266, line 2). Since 
the child was born at 10:40 p.m., his life may have been spared 
had he received medical attention as late as 9:40 to 10:40 a.m. 
the next morning. 
The issue thus becomes whether the child died because 
Defendant left him with the grandmother and mother to observe 
during the night or because Ivy failed to advise Defendant or 
others of the child's worsening condition which she observed 
throughout the night and during the early morning hours of the 
following day. 
Defendant assessed Ivy Young as being capable of observing 
the child immediately following birth. She was the mother of 
seven, four of whom were born at home (T. Vol. IV, page 52, line 
8 - page 55, line 1). Following delivery he advised her of a 
possible respiratory problem and told her that the child must be 
observed during the night regarding its temperature, color and 
respirations and to call if the child worsened (Icl. at page 96, 
line 13 - page 102, line 2). Ivy acknowledged that Dr. Warden 
asked her to observe the child during the night (T. Vol. II, page 
46, lines 19 - 22) although she denied he told her what to watch 
for (T. Vol. I, page 85, lines 22 - 23). Nevertheless, she knew 
that the body temperature of a newborn is important to its health 
(T. Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - 20) and that it was a very 
serious emergency if the child had difficulty breathing (^d.. at 
page 65, line 18 - page 68, line 11). Indeed, during the night, 
she did observe the extremities of the child becoming more blue 
(Id. at page 54, lines 14 - 19). She also observed the child's 
labored breathing and at approximately 8:00 a.m. she thought the 
child had stopped breathing (1(3. at page 65, line 18 - page 68, 
line 11). She knew she was to call the doctor if the child's 
condition worsened (Id. at page 51, line 6 - 20). 
Notwithstanding, she failed to timely call Defendant and when she 
did and he was not in she failed to identify herself or leave 
word of an emergency (1(3. at page 69, lines 2-13; page 71, line 
7 - page 72, line 4 and T. Vol. V, page 23, line 17 - page 24, 
line 21). Moreover, she failed to seek alternate emergency 
medical aid from any other source. 
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Since the child may have lived had medical attention been 
obtained within eleven to twelve hours after birth and since the 
delay in obtaining the needed medical care was the fault of 
grandmother rather than Defendant, there was clearly insufficient 
evidence to convict Defendant of negligent homicide. The child's 
death was not caused by Defendant leaving the child with the 
family. It resulted because the child's grandmother failed to 
reasonably act when she perceived the child's deteriorating 
condition. 
There is no evidence that Defendant should have foreseen 
that Ivy Young would fail to contact him or timely call for 
alternate emergency medical care after having perceived that the 
child's condition was worsening. 
Under the circumstances, th^ evidence was insufficient to 
convict Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. As stated in 
Harmon; 
. . . only when the evidence . . . is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant committed the crime . . . (will the 
court reverse). (Emphasis added) 
99 Utah Adv. Rpt. at page 35. 
Such is the case here. Defendant is entitled to have his 
conviction reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State has failed to prove Defendant committed the 
offense of negligent homicide. FIRST, it failed to prove the 
proper medical standard of care by using expert witnesses of a 
different school of medicine than Defendant. SECOND, it failed 
to present evidence regarding the degree of deviation from the 
alleged standard of care and THIRD, there was insufficient 
evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a causal link 
between Defendant's leaving the child at the Young home for 
observation immediately following birth and the death of the 
child approximately thirteen hours thereafter. The child's 
grandmother perceived its deteriorating medical condition. 
Nevertheless, she failed to timely or reasonably respond by way 
of advising Defendant so he could properly react or by contacting 
other medical emergency facilities so as to provide needed 
medical care for the child. 
Consequently, Defendant is entitled to have this Court 
reverse his conviction rendered in the Qourt below. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
DAR^tU ^ C^BANSEN • « 
Attorney for Defendant 
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